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LOUISIANA'S NEW "KILL THE CARJACKER"
STATUTE: SELF-DEFENSE OR INSTANT
INJUSTICE?
The new Louisiana "Kill the Caracker" statute (the Statute),
enacted in July of 1997, has made it easier for Louisiana motorists to
take the law into their own hands. The statute justifies homicide
when either a passenger or driver reasonably believes that another
person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery
of the vehicle through the use of any unlawful force.2 The statute
imposes no duty to retreat, but instead justifies homicide committed
by a passenger or driver inside the vehicle against an individual who
is attempting to unlawfully enter the vehicle, if the passenger or
driver "reasonably believes" that deadly force is necessary either to
prevent the individual's unlawful entry or to force the individual out
of the vehicle.3
1. 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1378 (West). This new law became a part of the Louisiana
"Kill the Burglar" statute. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1999), amended by
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.20(3)-(4) (West 1998).
2. Section 3 of the "Kill the Burglar" statute provides in full:
A homicide is justifiable when committed against a person whom one reasonably
believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling or
place of business, or when committed against a person whom one reasonably believes
is attempting to use any unlawful force against a person present in a motor vehicle as
defined in R.S. 32:1(40), while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or
robbery of such dwelling, business, or motor vehicle. The homicide shall be justifiable
even though the person does not retreat from the encounter.
Section 14:20(3).
3. See id Section 4 of the "Kill the Burglar" statute provides in full:
A homicide is justifiable: When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a
place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), against a person who
is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor
vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or
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The new law is controversial, in part because Louisiana citizens
may carry concealed weapons.4 While some call it "a license to kill"
and believe the statute encourages rash decisions of instant "justice,"5
others view it as an important form of protection for innocent
automobile drivers. 6 Still others are troubled that the law has the
potential of rendering minors more vulnerable to carijackings because
shrewd carjackers will intentionally target minors, knowing that
minors cannot carry concealed weapons.7 Other concerns abound.
Some fear that the statute will cause drivers to "jump the gun," as in
the case of Yoshihiro Hattori, a foreign exchange student who was
killed while trick-or-treating after a home owner accidentally mistook
him for a burglar and shot him.8 Others fear the statute will become a
motor vehicle, and the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that the
use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave
the premises or motor vehicle. The homicide shall be justifiable even though the
person committing the homicide does not retreat from the encounter.
Section 14:20(4).
4. See Editorial, Lawsiana, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 1997, at A8.
5. See Gregory Kane, Louisiana CarjackLawAllows Justice, Not Lynching, BALT. SUN,
Aug. 24, 1997, at IB; Rivera Live: Possible Ramifications of a New Caracking Law in
Louisiana (CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Possible Ramifications];
Rivera Live: Louisiana's Recently Passed Anti-Cariacking Legislation (CNBC television
broadcast, Aug. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Recently Passed].
6. Advocates of the law view it as a convenient statute "that will render unnecessary the
state of Louisiana having to charge law abiding citizens who chose to defend themselves
against carjackers." Kane. supra note 5, at lB.
7. See Richard Haymaker, Readers' Views, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 27,
1997, at 6B. Haymaker points out a problem with amending the "Kill the Burglar" statute to
include the "Kill the Carjacker" statute, stating: "Cars are different from homes. A predator
looking for a target can see into a car and determine whether the driver is under 21." Id.
8. See Kevin Johnson, Louisiana Law Aims at Carackers OKs Use of Deadly Force
Against Attack USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1997, at 3A. Hattori and a friend were on their way to a
Halloween party. Hattori had dressed up for the party in a "Saturday Night Fever" costume. The
two friends went to the wrong address and rang the doorbell to the Peairs' home. When Mrs.
Peairs answered the door, she screamed, and Mr. Peairs came outside with his gun after Hattori
and his friend had moved to the sidewalk. Hattori tried to communicate with Mr. Peairs, but
because he did not speak English very well, he gestured by waving his arms. Mr. Peairs shot
and killed Hattori. See N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1994, at A7.
A jury acquitted Peairs of manslaughter under Louisiana's "Kill the Burglar" statute,
leading many to fear that an extension of the "Kill the Burglar" statute to motor vehicles will
lead to similar tragic mistakes with no legal deterrent. See Possible Ramifications, supra note 5.
There is a fear that people will mistake persons who approach their automobiles for cajackers.
One such incident occurred in Missouri in 1996. See Johnson v. Grob, 928 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.
Mo. 1996) (involving a motorist who panicked when a Special Agent of the United States
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and firearms and an officer of the Missouri State Highway patrol
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"lynch law" because they believe that most cariackers-the potential
victims of the "Kill the Carjacker" statute-are Black persons.9
The Louisiana legislature designed the "Kill the Carjacker" statute
in response to the increasing rate of cariackings in Louisiana-
especially in New Orleans.10 The legislature deemed the "Kill the
Carjacker" statute a necessity even though the federal government
had a cariacking statute," Louisiana had previously enacted a
carjacking statute in 1993,12 and it had self-defense legislation on the
books.' 3 The "Kill the Carijacker" statute has shifted the focus of the
approached her car during a covert operation). See also St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d
20, 23 (Ist Cir. 1995); Gutierrez-Rodriquez v. Cartegena, 882 F.2d 553, 557-561 (Ist Cir.
1989); Beran v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 886, 888-890 (D.D.C. 1991).
9. See Gregory Kane, New Louisiana Statute on Carijacking Isn't Lynch Law, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 2, 1997, at B7.
10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (West 1998), amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
. 14.20(3)-(4) (West 1997). See Possible Ramifications, supra note 5. Louisiana State
Representative C. Emile Bruneau Jr., who sponsored the bill, stated that "[w]e have had some
horrible carjackings in Louisiana . . we have had a significant problem." Id.
11. The current federal caijacking statute states:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle
that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts
to do so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury ... results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up
to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992)) (emphasis added).
Most state carjacking charges can also occur under the federal carjacking statute because most
automobiles have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.
12 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:64.2 (West 1997). The statute provides:
A. Carjacking is the intentional taking of a motor vehicle, as defined in R.S. 32:1(40)
belonging to another person, in the presence of that person, or in the presence of a
passenger, or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle, by the use of
force or intimidation.
B. Whomever commits the crime of carijacking shall be imprisoned at hard labor for
not less than two years and for not more than twenty years, without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence.
Id.
13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(l)-(2) (West 1997). The self-defense statute's pertinent
sections read as follows:
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law away from considering both the carjacker's intent and the
motorist's reasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm. The statute focuses, instead, on the
motorist's reasonable belief that any unlawful force would be used
against him or her or that deadly force was necessary to prevent the
unlawful entry into, or force the carijacker out of, the vehicle. 14
This note suggests that the "Kill the Carjacker" statute is
excessive and unreasonable, because it encourages motorists to resort
to homicide when it is unnecessary to protect themselves against
death or great bodily harm. The federal carjacking statute' 5 and the
Louisiana self-defense statute16  adequately enable Louisiana
motorists to protect themselves against a threat of death or great
bodily harm. The new statute goes too far, not only because it allows
Louisiana motorists to use deadly force to combat the mere fear that
any unlawful force will be used against them, but also because it
justifies homicide for the sake of protecting mere personal property.
Furthermore, under no circumstances does the statute impose a duty
to retreat.17 Therefore, the statute is dangerous and extreme and
should be repealed.
Part I of this note examines the requirements of the Louisiana's
"Kill the Carjacker" law, the federal carjacking statute, Louisiana's
self-defense statute, and Louisiana's carijacking statute. Part II is an
analysis and comparison of how a victim or potential victim, of a
carjacking may legally react under (a) the "Kill the Carjacker"
A homicide is justifiable:
When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in
imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is
necessary to save himself from that danger.
When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving
danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an
offense is about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention.
The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that
there would be serious danger to his own life orperson if he attempted to prevent the
felony without the killing.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. See id.
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1997).
16. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(l)-(2) (West 1997).
17. See id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/6
1999] LOUISIANA'S NEW "KILL THE CARJACKER" STATUTE 113
statute, (b) the federal caracking statute coupled with Louisiana's
self-defense statute, and (c) the self-defense statute combined with
Louisiana's 1993 carjacking statute. Part III proposes repealing the
"Kill the Carjacker" statute and discusses other alternatives for
Louisiana legislature, such as a carjacking task force, amendments to
the "Kill the Carjacker" statute, and greater education on carijacking
prevention.
I. HISTORY
Reports of the increasing number of, and increasing violence of,
carjackings outraged the nation and made the country aware of the
need to combat carjackings with added force.1 8 Carijackings and
attempted carjackings numbered over 35,000 per year from 1987-
1992, with nearly 11,000 of them involving the use of firearms.19
Furthermore, the ghastly carijacking of Pamela Basu, in which Basu
was killed after being dragged behind her car and after her infant
daughter was tossed onto the street, prompted Congress to legislate
carjacking as a federal offense.2°
18. See F. Georgann Wing, Putting the Brakes on Carjacking or Accelerating It? The Anti
Car Theft Act of 1992, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 385, 390 (1994). Earlier attempts to combat auto-
theft, such as the Motor Vehicle Law Enforcement Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2034
(1984), had proved ineffective. In fact, carjackings became more popular as traditional auto
theft became increasingly troublesome due to Americans' increased use of auto theft devices.
See Wing, supra, at 385-86. See also 138 CONG. REC. 9340 (1992) (statement of Sen. Pressler)
(proposing S-2613, the Anti-Car theft Act of 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S27645 (1992) (statement
of Sen. Pressler) (proposing amendment no. 3165, the Car Theft Prevention and Deterrence
Act), cited in Wing, supra, at 385-86; and Nora Zamichow, Deadly Caracking Raises
Questions and Fears; Crime Wave: Commandeering of Cars is On the Increase. San Diego has
had 171 Cases this Year, as the Nationwide Trend Continues, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at BI.
19. See Mary C. Michenfelder, Note, The Federal Carjacking Statute: To Be or Not to
Be? An Analysis of the Propriety of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, 39 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 1009, 1012-13
(1995); US. Carjacking Attempts Average 35,000 a Year, UPI, Apr. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File, cited in Michenfelder, id. See also It Has Come to Our
Attention, 58 FED. PROBATION 87 (1994).
20. See United States v. Holloway, 921 F. Supp. 155, 157-158 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). In 1992,
Pamela Basu and her infant daughter were in their vehicle when two men forced Basu out of the
car. When she tried to save her baby, Basu became caught in her seatbelt, which was hanging
out of the car. The men drove away, dragging Basu for a mile and a half. They dislodged Basu
from the seatbelt by driving near a fence so that her body would strike it, resulting in Basu's
death. In addition, the carjackers threw the child out of the car and onto the pavement, leaving
her unharmed. Graciela Sevilla & Dan Beyers, Mother Killed in Apparent Caracking; Baby in
Car Seat Tossed From Vehicle, WASH. POST., Sept. 9, 1992, at Al.
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The original federal carjacking statute required that the perpetrator
possess a firearm while committing the cariacking and did not
provide for the death penalty.21 Congress amended the statute in 1994
to provide for the death penalty when a carjacking results in homicide
and dropped the requirement that the perpetrator possess a firearm at
the time of the caijacking.22 Instead, the perpetrator must act with
"the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." 23 The effect of the
1994 amendments was to broaden the reach of the federal statute.
24
The 1994 amendments caused disparities in the application of the
federal carijacking statute because the United States Courts of
Appeals interpret the intent requirement of the statute differently. In
United States v. Anderson, the Third Circuit held that a showing of
conditional intent satisfied the intent element of the federal
cajacking statute.25 Under Anderson, a court should vindicate a
motorist of killing or injuring a suspected carjacker only if the
carjacker intended to kill or seriously harm the motorist upon the
motorist's refusal to surrender his or her vehicle.26 The Second
As a result of heinous, violent cadjackings like the Basu cadjacking, Congress enacted the
federal carjacking statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992)).
Shortly before President Bush signed the federal caijacking statute in 1992, he echoed the
sentiment of a nation that had had enough of this violent crime, stating, "[w]e cannot put up
with this type of animal behavior. These people have no place in decent society ... and they
can rot in jail for crimes like that." Speech by President George Bush in St. Louis, Missouri
(Sept. 28, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednews File. See also 139 CONG. REC.
S15,295-01, S15,301 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (introducing an
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2119 to impose the death penalty in cases where death results and to
remove the possession of firearm element of the crime, and stating "It was the collective horror
over that [Basu] case that prompted Congress to federalize caracking and provide stiffpenalties
for the crime"); 138 CONG. REC. 33452 (1992) (statement of Rep. Morella) (mentioning the
Basu killing in support of H.R. 4542 the Anti-Car Theft Act, which would become 18 U.S.C. §
2119); 138 CONG. REC. 25672, 34372 (1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (carrying support
for the proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2119 in order to stop "atrocities" such as the Basu incident); 138
CONG. REc. 25146 (1992) (statement of Cong. Bliley) (calling for federal legislation
prescribing the death penalty as punishment to fight carjackings like the one in which Basu was
killed).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
23. Id.
24. See 139 CONG. REC. S15295, S15301 (1993)(statement of Sen. Lieberman).
25. United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1997).
26. In Anderson, the United States charged the defendant under the federal carjacking
statute. See 108 F.3d at 479. Fleeing the scene of a crime with the police in pursuit, the
defendant approached a man washing his car and pressed his gun against the back of the man's
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Circuit held similarly in United States v. Arnold27 by affirming
United States v. Holloway28-an opinion from the Eastern District of
New York holding that the government satisfies the intent element of
a carIjacking under the federal carjacking statute when it establishes
that the carijacker intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a
victim who gave the carjacker "a hard time., 29
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit addressed the intent question in
United States v. Romero when it held that the federal carjacking
statute requires a showing of conditional intent because "conditional
intent is still intent., 30 The court criticized the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Randolph, in which the Court of Appeals
neck, He told the man that the police were after him and that he was taking the man's car. When
the man tried to stop the defendant by running to the driver's side of the car, the defendant
pointed a gun out of the driver's side of the car and drove away. See id. at 479-480. On appeal
from his conviction, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to fulfill the intent
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 because the government did not prove that he intended to
cause death or serious bodily injury to the victim. The Third Circuit held that there was
sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to his
carjacking victim if the victim had refused to relinquish the vehicle. 108 F.3d at 485. The court
found the defendant's conditional intent sufficient to convict him under the federal carjacking
statute. d. at 481-485.
The Anderson court considered the 1994 amendment to the former federal caijacking
statute, which dropped the requirement that the carjacker possess a firearm, to require merely
that the caijacker intend "to cause death or serious bodily harm." The court noted that the
amendment's purpose was "to broaden and strengthen [the carjacking statute] so our U.S.
attorneys (sic) have every possible tool available to them to attack the problem;" to the court,
requinng unconditional intent would serve only to narrow the scope of the statute. See id. at 483
(citing 139 CONG. REC. S15295, S15301 (1993) (Statement of Sen. Lieberman)). The court
stated: "Rarely will there be a case where there will be evidence of a defendant's unconditional
intent to cause death or serious bodily harm whether or not the victim relinquishes his or her
car, yet the victim sustains no injuries," reasoning that Congress did not intend for the statute to
apply only where death or severe bodily injury results, as evidenced by the 1994 amendments'
enhanced penalties for situations where death or serious bodily injury result. See id. Finally, the
court used the test endorsed by Professors LaFave and Scott: "[w]here a crime requires the
defendant to have a specified intention, he has the required intention although it is a conditional
intention, 'unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the lav
defining the offense."' See id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(d), at 313 (1986) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6))).
The court concluded that the absence of an unconditional intent to cause death or serious bodily
harm did not negate any of the harms which the statute might have sought to prevent." See id. at
484.
27. 126 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997).
28. 921 F. Supp. 155 (N.Y. 1996).
29. Id. at 157.
30. 122 F.3d 1334, 1338 (citing United States v. Arrellalio, 812 F.2d 1209, 1211 n.2 (9th
Cir 1987), opinions corrected by 835 F.2d 235 (1987)).
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held that the federal carjacking statute requires more than a showing
of conditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm,
concluding instead that the federal statute requires the perpetrator to
possess specific, or unconditional, intent to cause the motorist's death
or serious bodily harm.31 A mere threat, according to the Randolph
court, is insufficient to demonstrate such specific intent and is
"tantamount to a conditional intent to harm. 32 The Romero court
31. 93 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1996).
32. Id. In Randolph, the defendant Randolph and four accomplices observed a woman
withdrawing cash from an ATM and drove their Jeep next to her vehicle. Id. at 651. Randolph
aimed a loaded semi-automatic assault rifle at the woman and directed her to hand over the
money while one of his accomplices tugged on her seat belt and told her that if she did what
they told her to do "she would be okay." Randolph took her money and her wallet and told her
to drive out of town, refusing to let her out of the car in spite of her numerous requests. Id.
Randolph had her pull the car over, told her to get out, and drove away, leaving her on the side
of the road unharmed. Id. She testified that she thought Randolph "would shoot her if she
disobeyed him." Id. After Randolph drove away, his accomplices, who had followed them out
of town, beat the woman and left her in a ditch as they drove away. Id. at 659. Randolph
testified that he did not intend to cause death or bodily injury to the woman, that he drove the
woman out of town so that she could not immediately call the police, and that he was unaware
that his accomplices would harm her. Id.
The court found insufficient evidence that Randolph had the requisite specific intent to kill
or seriously harm the victim, and vacated his conviction under the federal cajacking statute. 93
F.3d at 658. The court considered the same 1994 amendment considered by the court in
Anderson, and concluded that the purpose of the amendment is to convert "caracking from a
'general intent' to a 'specific intent' offense." Id. at 661. The court did not see any discrepancy
between the legislative intent and its interpretation of the statute. Id. However, this
interpretation did not persuade the Anderson court, which criticized Randolph for "directly
contraven[ing] the intent of Congress to broaden the application of the carjacking statute by the
inclusion of the 1994 amendments." 108 F.3d at 483.
Like the Anderson court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Randolph found guidance
from Professors LaFave and Scott: "[tihe addition of a specific intent element requires the
govemment to prove 'a special mental element ... above and beyond any mental state required
with respect to the [taking of a motor vehicle]."' 93 F.3d 656, 662 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE
AND AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5, at 315 (1986)). Moreover,
the Ninth Circuit determined that a mere threat was not sufficient to fulfill the elements of the
statute and held that although the threat made by Randolph's accomplice would fulfill the
element requiring "by force and violence or by intimidation," the threat could not fulfill the
element requiring an "intent to cause death or serious bodily harm" because it would render that
element of the crime mere "surplusage." Id. at 665. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
Applying the facts of the case to the federal carjacking statute, the court found several
significant reasons indicating that Randolph did not possess the requisite unconditional intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm to the woman whose car he took. First, the court placed
great weight on the fact that Randolph chose not to injure the woman even though he had every
opportunity to do so. 93 F.3d at 664. Second, he did not assault her and was not even near the
area where his accomplices assaulted her. Id. at 664. Finally, Randolph did not verbally threaten
her, and "said nothing to indicate any animosity toward the victim." Id.
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criticized the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Randolph for being in direct
conflict with both the plain language of the statute and a conclusion
that finds support in congressional intent,33 United States v. Lake,34
and United States v. Norwood35-opinions from the district courts of
the Virgin Islands and New Jersey holding that the federal carjacking
statute requires a showing of conditional intent.36
The Ninth Circuit, however, is not alone in requiring the
government to prove specific intent under the federal cajacking
statute. In United States v. Craft, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopted Randolph's
unconditional specific intent requirement.37 The Fifth Circuit, which
includes Louisiana, has yet to rule on this issue.
By 1997 New Orleans experienced an increase in the number of
carijackings-several of them high profile-in which victims were
"charged initially for defending themselves. 38 In response, the
33. See 122 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 1997).
34. 972 F. Supp. 328 (D. V. 1997).
35. 948 F. Supp. 374 (D. N.J. 1996).
36. See Lake, 972 F. Supp. at 332, Nomood, 948 F. Supp. at 379.
37. United States v. Craft, No. CRIM. A. 96-376, 1996 WL 745527 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
38. Between 1994 and 1995, auto thefts in New Orleans increased by fourteen percent.
See Joe Gyan Jr., Politics, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Mar. 3, 1996, at IB. Most vehicles
are stolen so that a chop shop can take the vehicle apart and sell the parts. See H.R. REP. No.
102-851, pt. 2, at 1 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2895; H.R. REP. No. 102-851, pt. 1,
at 14 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2830. See also 138 CoNG. REc. 9340 (1992)
(statement of Sen. Pressler); 138 CONG. REc. 27977-79, 34373-74 (1992) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). In 1994, out of forty-seven cities with a population of over one million, New
Orleans ranked as the fifth highest in terms of murder count, thirteenth in violent crimes, and
twentieth in property crimes. See id. An average of two caijackings per day occurred in New
Orleans in 1996. See Ian Brodie, Drivers Get Right to Shoot Car Thieves, THE TIMES (London),
Aug. 4, 1997, at 14. Over 200 carjackings occurred in New Orleans within the first six months
of 1997. See World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997). One such case
was the carjacking of Miss Louisiana, Erika Schwarz. In 1996, Ms. Schwarz was caijacked in a
driveway. See Brodie, supra. When she spoke of the incident, she stated, "I was sitting in that
seat ... [a]nd I just start running ... [a]nd he yells at me 'stop!' [a]nd at that moment I just
knew he was going to shot me.. . and he said 'Drop your purse!' See Possible Ramifications,
supra note 5. Ms. Schwarz was unharmed, but supports the "Kill the Carjacker" statute. See
World News Tonight, supra. Another high profile case involved the caijacking, rape, and
murder of a young advertising executive in New Orleans shortly before the 1997 Mardi Gras.
See Guy Coates, Motorists in Louisiana Can Use Deadly Force; Law Arms Carjacking Victims,
CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at 3. Although downtown New Orleans is supposed to be
the safest area in New Orleans, it is not immune from carjackings. See Gyan, supra, at 1B. A
young lawyer was recently carjacked in a parking lot in the central business district. He was
abducted and murdered by the caijackers. See id. See Louisiana Oks Shooting of Carackers,
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Louisiana legislature enacted the "Kill the Carjacker" statute into law
in July of 199739 by incorporating it into the Louisiana defense-of-
dwelling statute40 (the "Kill the Burglar" statute), whose rationale
derives from the old English theory that it is as important to defend a
home as it is to defend a life.41 Older defense-of-dwelling statutes
broadly permit homeowners to use deadly force against intruders,
while some merely require the homeowner to a warn an intruder,
regardless of whether the intruder was engaged in a felony.42 Modem
defense-of-dwelling statutes allow homeowners to use deadly force in
order to prevent certain types of felonies.43 Louisiana's "Kill the
Burglar" statute is unusually broad in this respect because it sanctions
homicide regardless of whether the intruder commits, or attempts to
commit, a felony, as long as the homeowner subjectively believes
that deadly force is necessary either to prevent entry into the dwelling
or to compel the intruder to leave the dwelling.44 Most states have not
considered whether their defense-of-dwelling statutes should sanction
the use of deadly force to protect against a mere dispossession of a
dwelling.45 Louisiana's "Kill the Burglar" statute does justify the use
of deadly force in such situations.46
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 14, 1997, at 19 (quoting Sandy Krasnoff, director of Victims and
Citizens Against Crimes).
39. The Louisiana legislature enacted the statute into law with an immensely successful
vote of 133 in favor of the statute and one vote against the statute. See Brodie, supra note 38.
40. Section 3 of the "Kill the Burglar" statute reads as follows:
A homicide is justifiable when committed against a person whom one reasonably
believes to be likely to use any unlavfulforce against a person present in a dwelling or
a place of business, while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery of
such dwelling or business. The homicide shall be justifiable even though the person
does not retreat from the encounter.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
41. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.9 at 467 (2d
Ed. 1986).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(4) (West 1997).
45. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 41, at 467.
46. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(4) (Vest 1997). Justifiable homicide in cases of
resisting dispossession of a dwelling found support in the 1924 English case Rex v. Hussey, 18
Crim. App. 160 (1924). Similarly, support for this proposition is found in the United States in
the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(i) (1985). It provides, "[t]he use of
deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that the person against
whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a
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Under Louisiana's "Kill the Burglar" statute a homeowner can use
deadly force against intruders in the home, without any obligation to
retreat, if the homeowner reasonably believes that the intruder might
use any unlawful force against anyone in the home.47 In addition, this
statute condones homicide when a person lawfully inside of a home
or business kills an intruder attempting to enter unlawfully, or who is
unlawfully present inside, a home or business if the person
reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to stop the intruder
from entering or to compel the intruder to leave.48
The sponsor of the "Kill the Carjacker" statute, State
Representative Emile "Peppi" Bruneau, expanded the statute to
permit the use of deadly force against carjackers because, considering
the amount of time that people spend in their automobiles, the vehicle
is an extension of the home.49 According to Representative Bruneau,
the purpose of the statute is two-fold: first, to act as a deterrent to
carjackers; and, second, to allow victims to defend themselves.50
Louisiana's "Kill the Carjacker" statute is the first in the nation to
justify the use of deadly force in order to resist dispossession of
property, thus begging the moral question of whether defending a
claim of right to its possession." Id.
47, See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3) (West 1997).
48. See id § 14:20(4). Section 4 of the "Kill the Burglar' statute read as follows:
A homicide is justifiable when committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling or a
place of business, against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into
the dwelling or place of business, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling
or place of business, and the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that
the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to
leave the premises. The homicide shall be justifiable even though the person
committing the homicide does not retreat from the encounter.
Id (emphasis added).
49. See Recently Passed, supra note 5; and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (West
1998).
50. See id. Louisiana Governor Mike Foster commended the legislation, stating:
In Louisiana, if you break into somebody's home, it's too bad .... You're not going to
go before a grand jury if you dispense with somebody who breaks into your home....
If you're involved in an armed carijacking, the same thing happens.... You are in
trouble in Louisiana and you may be dispensed with.
Bill McMahon, Governor Praises Carjacking Law, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Aug. 14,
1997, at IIA.
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motor vehicle justifies the use of deadly force.51
A typical defense-of-property statute provides that "[o]ne is
justified in using reasonable force to protect his property from
trespass or theft, when he reasonably believes that his property is in
immediate danger of such an unlawful interference that the use of
such force is necessary to avoid the danger."52 The Louisiana
defense-of-property statute is similar, allowing the reasonable use of
force (but not deadly force) to protect property from an unlawful
trespass if the property owner subjectively believes that force is
necessary to prevent the offense.53 Prior to the enactment of the "Kill
the Carjacker" statute, Louisiana law allowed a victim of a carjacking
or attempted carjacking to use reasonable force to prevent the
carjacking, but did not allow use of deadly force unless the victim
reasonably believed that he or she was in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily harm.5 4 The enactment of the "Kill the Carjacker"
statute, however, rendered Louisiana's defense-of-property55 and
self-defense 56  statutes inapplicable to carjacking, and, instead,
applied the "Kill the Burglar" statute,57 to carjacking. In other words,
the "Kill the Carjacker" statute expanded the reach of the "Kill the
Burglar" statute to permit the use of deadly force against actual and
attempted carjackings.
51. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (vest 1998).
52. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 41, at 667.
53. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:19 (West 1997). The statute provides:
The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable, when committed
for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense
or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession; provided that the force or
violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense,
and that this article shall not apply where the force or violence results in a homicide.
Id. The Louisiana defense-of-property statute conforms with LaFave and Scott's view that
"deadly force is never reasonable except where the unlawful interference with property is
accompanied by a threat of deadly force (in which case it is proper to use deadly force in self-
defense) or where the unlawful interference involves an invasion of an occupied dwelling
house...." LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 41, at 667. The statute also conforms to the Model
Penal Code, which requires a subjective belief that the force is necessary. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.06(1) (1985).
54. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:19,14:20(1) (West 1999).
55. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:19 (West 1997).
56. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1) (West 1999).
57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (West 1998) (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:20(3)-(4) (Vest 1997)).
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On November 3, 1997, the first Louisiana citizen took advantage
of the "Kill the Carijacker" statute. 58 That night three men spotted
twenty-one year-old Aaron Bottoms and a friend driving a Monte
Carlo.59 After pursuing Bottoms for several miles, one of the men,
Ernest Allen, approached the vehicle and pointed a semi-automatic
weapon at Bottoms' head.6° In response, Bottoms drew a gun and
shot Allen.61 Bottoms stated that "he didn't think for a second about
the 'Shoot the Carjacker' law, he just wanted to save his own life.",62
Sheriff Harry Lee stated that although he personally found Bottoms'
actions permissible irrespective of the "Kill the Carjacker" statute,
the existence of the statute legitimized his decision not to arrest
Bottoms. 63 Representative Bruneau remarked that Bottoms' was the
classic case with which the "Kill the Carijacker" statute was designed
to deal.64
Louisiana is not the only state with a history of carjacking
problems. Detroit, Michigan faced problems similar to those facing
New Orleans, and reacted by creating an anti-carjacking task force. 65
58. See Stephanie Grace, Lee: Carjacker Shooting is Clear-Cut; Jeff Case Getting
National Attention, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 6, 1997, at BI.
59. See id. They followed Bottoms for three and a half miles to a secluded street, when
they pulled their vehicle in front of Bottoms' vehicle and slammed on the brakes, cutting off
Bottoms. See CNN Today: New Orleans Man Legally Shoots Suspected Carjacker (CNN
television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1997) [hereinafter CNN].
60. See Grace, supra note 58. According Bottoms, he heard Allen cock the gun and
thought: "Oh. my God, he's going to kill us!" See Stephanie Grace, Carijack Law's P' Test in
Jeff No Charges Filed Against Shooter, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 5, 1997, at Al
[hereinafter No Charges Filed]; CNN, supra note 59.
61. See Grace, supra note 58. Bottoms had a revolver sitting next to him. See id. He had a
concealed weapons permit and was carrying a concealed weapon legally under Louisiana law.
See No Charges Filed supra note 60. Allen's accomplices drove off in their vehicle and
Bottoms called 911. See id. Police later found Allen one block from the scene of the crime,
armed with a gun. See id. Allen's accomplices told the police that they intended to commit a
cajacking. See id.
62. See CNN. supra note 60.
63. See No Charges Filed, supra note 60.
64. See Grace, supra note 58.
65. In 1985, Michigan ranked as the second highest state in auto theft. See Gordon Witkin
et al., Willing to Killfor a Car, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept 21, 1992, at 40,42. In 1986, in
response to the problem, Michigan charged a one dollar surcharge on every auto insurance
policy issued in the state in order to fund an anti-cajacking task force (The Michigan
Automobile Theft Prevention Authority). See id. The money was spent to hire a full time staff
of 91 police officers, 7 prosecutors, and 13 supporting staff members dedicated full-time to
fighting auto theft. See id. The task force was very successful and decreased Michigan's
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The task force, combined with the efforts of the Michigan police and
a campaign urging residents to purchase cellular phones, effectively
decreased carijackings by sixty-six percent in one year.66 Michigan's
response to carjacking is more logical and less drastic than
Louisiana's.
II. ANALYSIS
The "Kill the Carjacker" statute is not a logical extension of the
"Kill the Burglar" statute. Originally, defense-of-dwelling statutes
reflected the theory that the structures that shelter life were "places of
security" equal in importance to life itself, but today many states limit
their defense-of-dwelling statutes to allow use of deadly force only to
prevent the commission of a felony, recognizing that the protection of
life and limb is already guaranteed under self-defense statutes.67 A
motor vehicle, however, is not a dwelling and is not traditionally
regarded as a "place of security." Motor vehicles are personal
property and, although individuals may spend a substantial amount of
time in them, should be treated like other items of personal property
governed by defense-of-property statutes.68 Moreover, persons inside
motor vehicles are-and should remain-protected by self-defense
ranking from second highest in car thefts in 1985 to eighth highest in 1991. See id. at 43. The
state task force, however, was not sufficiently effective as indicated by the remaining high rate
of cadackings. During two summer months in 1991, Detroit residents experienced 406
carijackings at gunpoint. See Tammy Joyner, Carackings Could Capsize Insurance Reform
Efforts, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 17, 1991, at A5 (stating figures obtained from Detroit Police
Reports; cited in Wing, supra note 18, at 385, 386).
66. The Detroit anti-carijacking task force succeeded in reducing the city's carjacking rate
from an average of seventy-five per week in 1991 to an average of twenty-five per week in
1992. See Avis Thomas-Lester and Santiago O'Donnell, Forces Team Up to Fight Carjacking
and Its 'Fear Factor, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1992 at B4. A similar task force in Houston
decreased carjackings by fifty percent. See id. While the number of caijackings rose nationally,
Michigan's caijacking rate decreased. See Hearings on H.B. 4542 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 170 (prepared
statement of Colonel Michael D. Robinson, Director, Michigan State Police). Michigan also
replaced its "motorist aid phone system" with signs informing people to call 911 using their car
telephones. See Bill Laitner, Car Telephones Are Plugged As Emergency Alert Devices,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 12, 1991, at El. Michigan residents reacted by increasing their
purchases of car telephones. See id.
67. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
68. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:19 (West 1997).
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laws.69 The common law maxim states that "[t]he preservation of
human life and limb from grievous harm is of more importance to
society than the protection of property., 70  In Louisiana the
unfortunate consequence of the "Kill the Carjacker" statute is that the
preservation of motor vehicles is more important than the
preservation of life and limb.
The histories behind the federal and the Louisiana carjacking
statutes are similar. Both were enacted because of an acceleration in
carjackings and the high levels of violence associated with them.7 '
Congress and the Louisiana legislature passed their statutes, in part,
as a reaction to gruesome, high profile carjackings, and to deter
people from committing carjackings.72
The Louisiana legislature arguably faced a more critical situation
when it passed the "Kill the Carjacker" statute than did Congress
when it enacted the federal caracking statute. When Congress
enacted the federal carijacking statute in 1992, the number of
carjackings and attempted carjackings in the United States averaged
1.9 per state per day.73 When the Louisiana legislature passed the
"Kill the Carjacker" statute in July of 1997, New Orleans averaged
two cajackings-not including attempted carjackings-per day
throughout the year before the legislature enacted the statute, even
69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1)-(2) (West 1997). According to Professors
LaFave and Scott, "even when it is reasonable to use some force, it is not reasonable to use
deadly force to prevent threatened harm to property, such as a mere trespass or theft, even
though the harm cannot otherwise be prevented." See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 41, at 466.
70. 4 AM. JUR., Assault and Battery, § 63 (1936). See also 40 C.J.S., Homicide, § 101
(1991); 26 AM. JUR., Homicide, § 172 (1940); 1 BISHOP CRIMINAL LAW § 876 (9th ed. 1923); 6
C J.S., Assault and Battery, § 94 (1975). Similarly, the Model Penal Code, discussing the
desirability of permitting the use of deadly force to prevent dispossession of a dwelling, noted
"[t]o kill a man is... an evil both more serious and irrevocable than the loss of possession of a
dwelling for a period during which a court order is being obtained to recover it, at least if no
special circumstances are present." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06, Comment at 93 (1985). This
logic applies even more convincingly to the loss of possession of a mere motor vehicle. See id.
Interestingly enough, the Model Penal Code does allow the use of deadly force to prevent the
dispossession of a dwelling. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(i) (1985).
71. See supra notes 19, 38, 39 and accompanying text.
72. See id. One could argue that enacting the "Kill the Carijacker" statute has failed to
adequately combat rising incidents of caijackings and the high levels of violence associated
with them. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The author arrived at this figure by
dividing 35,000 carjackings per year by 365 days and by 50 states to arrive at (35,000/(365 x
50)) 1.9178 carijackings per day per state.
Washington University Open Scholarship
124 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 55:109
though the federal carjacking statute had been in effect for over four
years. 74 The Louisiana legislature's overwhelming support of the bill
is evidence that Louisiana citizens felt a need to take measures
beyond relying on the federal carijacking statute and the state self-
defense statute. 75 However, the question remains whether drastic
times called for such drastic measures.
Unlike the federal carjacking statute, one of the purposes of the
"Kill the Caracker" statute is to give individuals a right to use deadly
force to defend themselves.76 This begs the question of under what
conditions Louisiana citizens are allowed under the "Kill the
Carjacker" statute to use deadly force that they are not permitted to
use under Louisiana's self-defense statute. Under Louisiana's self-
defense statute, an individual may use deadly force if: (1) he or she
"reasonably believes" that there is either an "imminent danger" to his
or her life or that he or she is in "imminent danger" of "great bodily
harm"; and, (2) deadly force is necessary to prevent such danger. 7
An individual may also use deadly force for the "purpose of
preventing a violent or forcible felony," if he or she "reasonably
believes" that the commission of such felony would entail an
"imminent danger to life" or "great bodily harm," and that deadly
force is necessary to prevent the felony.78 Although the Louisiana
self-defense statute does not expressly mandate a duty to retreat,
74. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note, however, that in the
six months prior to the enactment of the "Kill the Caijacker" statute, the carijacking rate had
actually decreased in New Orleans. Id.
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
77. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1) (1997). The relevant portion of the self-defense
statute reads as follows: "A homicide is justifiable when committed in self-defense by one who
reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily
harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger." Id.
78. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (1997). The relevant portion of the self-defense
statute reads as follows:
A homicide is justifiable when committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or
forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably
believes that such an offense is about to be committed and that such an action is
necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of
a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he
attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.
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courts will analyze the availability of a safe retreat in assessing the
reasonableness of an individual's belief in the necessity of deadly
force.
Under section 1 of the Louisiana self-defense statute, a motorist
may use deadly force against a carjacker only if he or she "reasonably
believes" that there is an "imminent danger of death" or "great bodily
harm," and that deadly force is necessary to prevent that danger.
80
However, under the "Kill the Carjacker" statute, the same motorist
need not fear imminent death, or even imminent bodily harm, in
order to use deadly force.81 Rather, a motorist need only reasonably
believe that the carjacker is "attempting to use any unlawful force,"
or subjectively believe that deadly force is needed "to prevent the
entry or to compel the intruder to leave the ... motor vehicle., 82 Not
only does the "Kill the Carjacker" statute justify homicide when a
motorist does not believe that he or she is threatened with death or
great bodily harm, it also explicitly specifies that there is no duty to
retreat.83 The absence of any inquiry into the motorist's failure to
retreat will justify killing carjackers in circumstances where a death
could have, and should have, been avoided.84
79. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 726, 729-30 (La. 1982); State v. McClain, 685
So 2d 590, 594 (La. Ct. App. 1996); State v. T.N., 650 So.2d 288, 290 (1995); State v.
Brumfield, 639 So.2d 312, 316 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Rader, 609 So.2d 857, 862-63 (La.
Ct. App 1992); State v. Dozier, 553 So.2d 911, 913 (La. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Stevenson,
447 So.2d 1125, 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1) (1997).
81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (1997).
82. Id.
83. See id. The absence of a duty to retreat sets the "Kill the Carijacker" statute apart from
traditional self-defense statutes because, under this new statute, courts will not examine the
reasonableness of a motorist's decision to kill by considering the possibility of a safe retreat.
Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (West 1998) (amending LA. REV. STAT ANN.
14:20(3)-(4) (West 1997)), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1985).
84. For example, consider that a small, obviously unarmed teenager approaches a
stronger, armed man who is driving a car and that the teenager demands the vehicle. As the
teenager pulls back his arm to punch the motorist, the motorist has several choices: block the
punch, accept the injury and seek legal redress; retreat; or shoot the teen. Under the "Kill the
Carjacker" statute, the possibility that the motorist could have retreated unharmed cannot enter
into the analysis of the court because the law gives the motorist a legal right to kill the teenager.
See LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3)-(4) (West 1998) (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:20(3)-(4) (West 1997)). However, under section 1 of the Louisiana self-defense statute, the
motorist would not have had the right to kill the teenager because he could not have reasonably
believed that death or great bodily harm was imminent. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1)
(West 1997). Criminal defense attorney Laurie White emphasizes this point, asking: "Is this
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The utility of the "Kill the Carjacker" statute is further obscured
when considered in light of the other provision of the self-defense
statute. In the case of a carjacking, section 2 of the Louisiana self-
defense statute permits a motorist to kill a carjacker who uses force
"involving danger to life or of great bodily harm" if the motorist, by
using such force, is attempting to stop the caracking and believes
that "there would be serious danger" to his or her life if he or she
attempted to stop the carjacking without using deadly force.85 Section
2 also permits a third party who is not the target of the carjacking to
86intervene to prevent the crime.
The case of Aaron Bottoms8 7 provides a paradigm in which to
highlight the adequacy of Louisiana's self-defense statute.88
According to Bottoms, Ernest Allen pursued him in his vehicle for
over three miles to a secluded area, pulled in front of him, and then
slammed on the brakes.89 Allen then ran towards Bottoms' vehicle
and pointed a gun at Bottoms' head.90 Bottoms stated that when he
heard Allen cock the gun he thought that Allen was going to kill him
and his passenger. 9'
These facts strongly indicate that even if Bottoms had killed
Allen, section 1 of Louisiana's self-defense statute would have
justified his actions. 92 Section 2 of the self-defense statute, combined
[law] going to allow a husband to kill a wife who's trying to keep him from leaving with the
children?" See Possible Ramifications, supra note 5.
85. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2), (4) (West 1997), amended by LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:20(4) (West 1998). For the definition of"caijacking" under the Louisiana Criminal
statutes, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:64(2)(A)-(B) (West 1997).
86. See id. The statute allows a motorist who drives by what he or she reasonably believes
to be a caijacking in progress to kill the presumed carijacker. It is easy to imagine a situation in
which a man asks directions from the driver of a car and, as he leans towards the car, reaches
into his coat to pull out a pencil and some paper to write down directions. Passers-by might
reasonably believe that the man is attempting a carjacking by reaching for a knife or a gun.
Under the "Kill the Carjacker" statute, passers-by would have the right to kill the man.
87. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(l)-(2) (West 1997).
89. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1) (West 1997). According to Bottoms' statements, he
subjectively believed that he was "in imminent danger of losing his life" and that the use of
deadly force was "necessary to save himself from that danger." See supra note 59 and
accompanying text § 14:20(1). This belief is objectively reasonable when considering that
Allen pursued Bottoms for three-and-a-half miles into a secluded area, stopped him, and
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with the federal carjacking statute, would have also provided Bottoms
with a safe harbor.93 Because Allen apparently attempted a carjacking
within the definition of the federal carjacking statute, section 2 of the
Louisiana self-defense statute justifies Bottoms' response.94 This
justification for Bottoms' response rests on the fact that he attempted
to prevent a violent felony involving danger to his life and that he
reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent the
carjacking. Likewise, combining the Louisiana caracking statute
with section 2 of the general self-defense statute also legitimizes
Bottoms response to Allen's attack.95
pointed a cocked gun at Bottoms' head. The high rate of violence associated with carijackings in
Louisiana also contributes to Bottoms' reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of
losing his life.
93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (West 1997); and 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1997). This
statement rests on the assumption that the vehicle was "transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce." § 2119.
94. Allen's cohorts admitted to the police that they intended to commit a carijacking. See
supra note 61. Allen's actions appear to constitute an attempted caijacking under the federal
carjacking statute because he used "intimidation," pointed a cocked gun at Bottoms' head,
arguably indicating an "intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." See § 2119. Whether
Allen's actions qualify as such under § 2119 depends on the Fifth Circuit's view of the required
intent element as either conditional or unconditional. The majority of the Circuits view the
intent requirement as conditional, meaning that a defendant cannot be convicted of carjacking
unless the government can prove that he or she intended to cause death or serious bodily harm
to the victim if the victim resisted. See. e.g., United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478 (3d Cir.
1997); United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d
1334 (10th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit has not addressed this issue. Under an Anderson
analysis, a court would likely find that Allen violated the federal carjacking statute concluding
that pointing a cocked gun at Bottoms' head rises to the level of the facts in Anderson, in which
a caidacker pointed a gun at the victim's neck but did not physically harm him. See Anderson,
108 F.3d at 479. The caijacker's acts in Anderson fulfilled the intent requirement of the federal
carjacking statute. See id. at 485. Even if the Fifth Circuit adopted the unconditional intent
requirement of United States v. Randolph, one could argue that Allen intended to kill Bottoms
or cause him serious bodily injury regardless of whether Bottoms resisted because Allen
pointed his gun at Bottoms' head even before he demanded the vehicle, 93 F.3d 656 (9th Cir.
1996), giving Bottoms reason to believe that death was imminent regardless of whether he
surTendered his vehicle. See CNN supra note 59. Even if the Fifth Circuit failed to find that
Allen had the requisite intent under the federal carjacking statute, Bottoms' actions remain
justifiable under section 1 of the Louisiana self-defense statute. See LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. §
14:20(1) (West 1997). 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119. The self-defense statute applies to Allen's actions
because violation of the federal caijacking statute constitutes a felony. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119.
95. Section 2 justifies Bottoms' actions absent the federal carjacking statute because
Allen's attempted carjacking constitutes an attempted felony under Louisiana's 1993 carJacking
statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:20(2), 14:64.2 (West 1997). The 1993 carjacking statute is
void of any requirement that the carjacker intended to cause the victim death or serious bodily
harm, thus enlarging the class of those individuals who can be considered carjacking victims
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According to the sponsor of the "Kill the Carjacker" statute, the
Bottoms' scenario represents the "classic case" for which the statute
was enacted.96 Nevertheless, the "Kill the Carjacker" statute is
unnecessary to justify Bottoms' action. 97 Bottoms stated that he shot
Allen to prevent him from killing Bottoms and his passenger-not to
prevent an unlawful entry into his vehicle-and that he never
considered the "Kill the Caracker" statute when he pulled the
trigger.
98
The "Kill the Carjacker" statute creates unnecessary dangers in
light of the availability of Louisiana's self-defense statute. The self-
defense statute already permits individuals in vehicles to use deadly
force to protect themselves against carjackers when they reasonably
believe that the carjacker intends to kill them or cause them great
bodily harm. 99 Although the Louisiana legislature designed the "Kill
the Carjacker" statute to allow motorists to protect themselves, the
statute goes too far because it allows a motorist to kill a carjacker
even if the motorist knows that he or she is not in danger of death or
great bodily harm, but believes only that the carjacker intends to use
some degree of unlawful force. 100 The breadth of the statute creates
problems also because it allows a motorist to kill a carjacker to
prevent unlawful entry into the vehicle or to compel the carjacker to
under state law beyond the class of those who can be so considered under the federal carjacking
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1997). The 1993 carjacking statute only requires the state to
prove that the carjacker intended to take the vehicle (which, Allen admitted, he did) by force or
intimidation (such as cocking a gun and pointing it at the victim's head). See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:64.2 (Vest 1997).
96. See Grace, supra note 58 and accompanying text. The Bottoms case resembles
Johnson v. Grob, in which an unmarked vehicle blocked Toni Johnson's vehicle, and two
armed assailants jumped from the vehicle and pointed guns at Johnson. See Johnson v. Grob,
928 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1996). In the Johnson case, however, the "assailants" turned out to
be plain-clothed law enforcement officers. See 928 F. Supp. at 894. If Johnson had occurred in
Louisiana, under the "Kill the Cariacker" statute, Johnson might have "jumped the gun" and
killed the officers.
97. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. Even the town sheriff believed that the
"Kill the Carjacker" statute was unnecessary to protect Bottoms' actions. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
98. The "Kill the Carjacker" statute justifies the use of deadly force to prevent an
unlawful entry into a vehicle, but Bottoms, by his own admissions, choose not to pursue such
actions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(4) (Vest 1998). See supra notes 54, 92 and
accompanying text.
99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1)-(2) (West 1997).
100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(3)-(4) (,Vest 1998).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/6
1999] LOUISIANA'S NEW "KILL THE CARJACKER" STATUTE 129
exit the vehicle.' 0' Although some refer to the statute as "instant
justice,"10 2 no justice exists in allowing an individual to kill to protect
against any degree unlawful force or against unlawful entry or
dispossession of private property. Unless a carjacker caused loss of
life or great bodily harm, the justice system should punish him or her
with reasonable and appropriate penalties, not with the "instant
justice" of deadly force.'0 3
Applying the "Kill the Carjacker" statute to the facts of Randolph
reveals injustice embedded within the statute. 104 Assuming that the
Randolph carjacking occurred in Louisiana and, further, that the
motorist shot and killed the carjacker, her shooting would have
lacked justification under section 1 of Louisiana's self-defense statute
because, by her own admission, she feared that the carjacker would
kill her or cause her bodily harm only if she disobeyed him.1°5
Therefore, Louisiana would not sanction her use of deadly force.
10 6
Under this same set of assumptions, the motorist's shooting would
also have lacked justification under section 2 of Louisiana's self-
defense statute because the cajacker did not commit a carjacking
under the federal carjacking statute, and the motorist did not believe
that her life was in danger as long as she obeyed the carjacker. 07
101. See id.
102. Kane, supra note 5.
103. The federal cajacking statute either permits a fine, imprisonment for "any number of
years up to life," or the death penalty if death results from a carjacking or attempted carjacking.
18 U.SC. § 2119(3). The statute imposes lesser penalties for carjackings or attempted
carackings in which death does not occur. § 2119(1)-(2).
104. 93 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1996). See supra note 32.
105. See Randolph, 93 F.3d at 685.
106. See supra note 32. To receive protection under the self-defense statute, the victim
would have had to believe that she was "in imminent danger of losing [her] life or receiving
great bodily harm." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1) (West 1997).
107. Section 2 of the Louisiana self-defense statute sanctions deadly force to prevent "a
violent or forcible felony involving danger to life." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (1997).
Carjacking constitutes a violent or forcible felony, but the statute lacks application because the
defendant did not commit a carijacking under the federal carijacking statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2119
(1997). A greater possibility of justification exists in combining Louisiana's definition of
"caracking" under the 1993 earjacking statute with section 2 of the self-defense statute.
However, the author believes that the hypothetical shooting would still lack justification. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:20(2), 14:64.2 (West 1997). By wielding a gun and reassuring the
motorist that she should would be "okay" if she obeyed him, the defendant committed a
"carjacking" under the 1993 caracking statute because he intentionally took a motor vehicle
-belonging to another person, in the presence of that person ... by the use of force or
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Therefore, under Louisiana's self-defense statute, the motorist would
have lacked justification to kill the carjacker because he did not
commit a crime punishable by death.
A much different result occurs, however, under the "Kill the
Carjacker" statute. Under this law the motorist could justifiably have
killed the carjacker without the annoyance of temporarily loosing her
vehicle. The "Kill the Carjacker" statute would also have vindicated
the motorist of killing the carjacker in Randolph if she believed that
the defendant was "attempting to use any unlawful force" against
her. 108 Furthermore, the statute vests the motorist with the right to kill
the carjacker because he attempted to make an unlawful entry into
her vehicle and she reasonably believed that, if she resisted, the
carjacker would kill her.109 Though some see "instant justice" in the
carjacker's death, such a view is myopic and ignores the fact that real
justice would vacate the cajacker's conviction under the federal
carjacking statute because he did not intend to kill or cause serious
bodily harm to the motorist."0 When applied to the Randolph case,
the result under the "Kill the Carjacker" statute is strong evidence
that the statute is extreme and unjust.
A similar analysis applies to the facts in Anderson."' Assuming
again that the Anderson carjacking occurred in Louisiana and that the
motorist shot and killed the carjacker, the homicide would likely lack
justification under section 1 of Louisiana's self-defense statute.112 In
Anderson, the motorist ran to the driver's side of a car to attempt to
stop the carjacker.113 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that he
did not think the carjacker would kill him or cause him the requisite
serious bodily harm to trigger section 1 of the self-defense statute. 114
intimidation." § 14:64.2. Nevertheless, the Randolph motorist's belief that the defendant did not
intend to kill her or cause her bodily harm would negate section 2 of the self-defense statute.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (West 1997).
108. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3) (West 1991) (emphasis added).
109. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(4) (West 1998); Randolph, 93 F.3d at 658.
110. See Randolph, 93 F.3d at 667.
111. United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1997). See supra note 26.
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1) (WVest 1997). To receive the protections of the
statute, the motorist would have had to believe that he was "in imminent danger of losing his
life or receiving great bodily harm." Id.
113. Anderson, 108 F.3d at480.
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (West 1997).
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Similarly, section 2 of Louisiana's self-defense statute would not
sanction using deadly force against the carjacker because the
Anderson motorist did not believe that his life was in danger.1 15
Anderson, too, reaches a different outcome under the "Kill the
Carjacker" statute. Under the "Kill the Carijacker" statute, the
motorist in Anderson could have killed the carjacker even though the
carjacker obviously lacked any intention to kill or cause bodily harm
to the motorist. This disparity in results occurs because in Anderson
the carjacker attempted to make an unlawful entry into the motorist's
car and the motorist could reasonably have believed that, if he
refused to relinquish his vehicle, the carjacker would shoot him. 16
Once again, the "instant justice" of the carijacker's death fails to
compare with the real justice owed to the carjacker-namely, a
conviction under the federal carjacking statute and a fine or
imprisonment of no more than fifteen years, or both.1 7 The Anderson
case further demonstrates the extreme and unjust results of the "Kill
the Carjacker" statute.
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(1). Section 2 of the Louisiana self-defense statute
sanctions deadly force to prevent "a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life." Id. In
Anderson the defendant caijacked the victim in violation of the federal carijacking statute.
Anderson, 108 F.3d at 485; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1997). The defendant's actions also fit
Louisiana's definition of "carjacking" because he intentionally took the victim's vehicle "by...
intimidation." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:64.2 (West 1997). However, section 2 of the self-
defense statute is inapplicable because the motorist did not believe that the defendant's actions
threatened death or serious bodily injury. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (West 1992).
Significantly, the Anderson defendant had several opportunities to shoot the motorist but
refrained. The defendant's actions indicate his lack of intent to use deadly force against the
motorist.
116. This "reasonable belief' is supported by the court's finding that the defendant did not
intend to harm the victim unless the motorist refused to relinquish the vehicle. Anderson, 108
F.3d at 485.
117, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1997). Similarly when Miss Louisiana, Erika Schwarz, was
caijacked, the carjacker had every opportunity to kill her but, instead, left her unharmed.
Possible Ramifications, supra note 5. Even though Schwarz "just knew" the carijacker intended
to shoot her, she was wrong. See id. However, under the "Kill the Carjackee" statute, Schwarz
could, justifiably, have killed the carjacker even though the caijacker never intended to
physically harm her. See Possible Ramifications, supra note 5; LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:20(3)-(4) (West 1998). Even though the statute would justify Schwarz's mistaken killing
of a carjacker in this hypothetical situation, she supports the new law. See World News Tonight,
supra note 38.
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III. PROPOSAL & CONCLUSION
By enacting the "Kill the Carjacker" statute, the Louisiana
legislature effectively prioritized the value of an automobile over the
value of human life. This law encourages vigilante injustice,
condones unnecessary killings and rash judgments, and allows
victims to kill assailants even when no threat of death or bodily harm
exists. The statute goes too far because it allows a motorist to use
deadly force to combat any unlawful force based on the presence of a
motor vehicle and permits the motorist to kill for the sake of
protecting personal property. The statute puts anyone approaching a
vehicle at risk of being shot and makes motorists under the age of
twenty-one, who cannot carry concealed weapons, prime targets for
carjackings.118
The Louisiana legislature should repeal this law because
Louisiana's existing self-defense statute, in combination with the
federal or Louisiana carjacking statute, provides adequate protection
for motorists and prevents from becoming targets of carjackings. This
combination promotes justice, as illustrated by the analysis of the
relevant laws to the facts in the Bottoms, Anderson and Randolph
cases. The law should not allow a person to use deadly force to
protect property because this position conflicts with America's
traditional view that the value of life outweighs the value of
property
1 9
Louisiana should follow the Michigan response to carijackings in
Detroit.1 20 Louisiana and New Orleans should create a task force
designed to combat carackings and fund them, like Detroit, by
adding a small surcharge to automobile insurance policies issued in
Louisiana121 By doing this, Louisiana could easily generate the
revenue for instituting a task force. Louisiana should also encourage
its citizens to buy car telephones and provide motorists with rapid
assistance from the caijacking task force by creating an easy method
for reaching the task force. 122
118. See Readers' Views, supra note 7.
119. See, e.g., 4 AM. JUR., Assault and Battery § 63 (1936).
120. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text
121. See id.
122. This option is not feasible for some citizens because of the high cost of car telephones.
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In the alternative, Louisiana could amend the existing self-defense
statute to include aspects of the "Kill the Carjacker" statute without
any reference to the carjacker's intent. This amendment should
include aspects of a rational self-defense scheme, sanctioning the use
of deadly force only when a motorist reasonably believes it is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm and only after a
motorist can show that he or she did not have an opportunity to
retreat. To accomplish the aforementioned changes, the statute might
read: "A homicide is justifiable when committed against a person
whom one reasonably believes will imminently inflict death or
serious bodily injury on a person present in a motor vehicle while
committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery of such
motor vehicle." The courts should determine the availability of a safe
retreat in deciding whether the motorist's belief was reasonable.
Amending the self-defense statute as such would not change the
scope of Louisiana's existing self-defense statute, but would serve the
valuable purpose of informing Louisiana's citizens of their rights.
Finally, Louisiana should take steps to educate its citizens on
cajacking prevention.1 23 Louisiana could disseminate carjacking
prevention information in the form of a pamphlet either to individuals
registering their cars with the state or to those individuals applying
for drivers' licenses. The state could raise funds for this effort by
adding a small surcharge to either the registration fee or drivers'
license fee, or by increasing its penalties for carjackings and
providing stiff penalties for persons who operate chop shops to deter
carjackings.
With these reforms in place, Louisiana should experience the
same success in combating caracking as Michigan without
encouraging Louisiana citizens to take the law into their own hands,
However, Detroit's campaign to encourage citizens to purchase car telephones led to positive
results. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
123. There are several ways in which drivers and passengers can protect themselves,
including remaining in the vehicle if they fear a carijacking, honking the horn or screaming to
attract attention, traveling on lighted and populated roads, locking all doors and rolling up
windows, driving to a police station when being followed, and finally, not resisting an armed
caijacker. See Avis Thomas-Lester and Santiago O'Donnell, Forces Team Up to Fight
Carjacking and Its 'Fear Factor': Carijacking Prevention Tips, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1992 at
B4
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and without placing Louisiana's minor citizens in danger.
Furthermore, the state could prevent the unjust results that potentially
occur in situations such as those in Anderson and Randolph. This
reformed law would lead to fewer unnecessary deaths and allow the
justice system, rather than gun-toting drivers, to serve justice.
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